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This report examines Switzerland’s past and present political engagement with the EU, 
and how this operates for one of its key industries, the financial services sector. The 
report will help to inform debate around how the UK engages with the EU, by 
considering the experiences of Switzerland as a European country outside the EU, with a 
significant financial services industry. Key points to note are: 
A complex approach to engagement 
The Swiss approach is complex, consisting of a set of disparate sector-specific bilateral 
agreements developed over time, including on Schengen but excluding financial 
services, together with much informal Europeanisation, including autonomous adoption 
of EU law.  
Reliance on London for access to European capital markets 
Despite there being no comprehensive services accord, the Swiss financial sector has, 
so far, benefitted from largely unfettered access to the EU market, often through its 
presence in London. New EU regulations could change this. Tighter regulations would 
mean third countries constantly having to amend their parallel legislation, in line with 
any changes in Single Market legislation, in order to maintain equivalence over the 
course of time.  
A means of moving closer to the EU  
Switzerland’s bilateral approach has been a means of moving closer to the EU rather 
than maintaining distance – and around 40% of Swiss legislation derives from EU rules.  
Access to EU markets 
Maintaining Switzerland’s level of access to the Single Market requires continual 
closeness to the EU. A Free Trade agreement is not sufficient, especially for the financial 
sector. Maintaining access to European capital markets necessitates formal 
agreements and parallel legislation to that of the EU. 
Overall 
The Swiss approach is an exception, developed over time, rather than a formal model, 
and is a means of closer engagement with the EU. Forgoing complete access to the 
Single Market has had implications for the Swiss financial services sector, namely 
through the associated necessity of establishing operations in London, and has reduced 





There has been much debate recently around the UK’s relationship with the EU and the 
extent of its engagement in political and fiscal union. One approach to informing these 
discussions has been to consider the experiences of other European countries operating 
outside of the EU, for example Switzerland and Norway.  
Recent papers have looked, for example, at the benefits and costs to trade for 
Switzerland and Norway1, and at the benefits and drawbacks of their overall approach2 
and applied these in a UK context. This report looks in more detail at a specific sector – 
financial services – to gain a better understanding of how the Swiss approach operates 
for this sector, and what the UK can learn from this.  
The report examines the present Swiss relationship with the European Union, its bilateral 
sectoral agreements and the impact of the political and legal framework on the 
operation of Switzerland’s financial services industry. There follows an assessment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the EU-Switzerland relationship and a reflection on 
the lessons which could be drawn from it for the UK, albeit recognising that there are 
many other differences between the UK and Switzerland.  
While Switzerland’s EU engagement is often referred to as a ‘model’, the reality is more 
complex and problematic. In fact the Swiss situation is a one-off, and the Swiss have 
always been negotiating to draw closer to the EU, not to distance themselves. So the 
reflections on what we can learn from the Swiss approach, also suggest that this 
approach could not be easily applied to other Member States. 
2 The actual framework of Swiss engagement with the EU 
The details of Switzerland’s actual relationship are not always well known. In fact, over 
the past 60 years, Switzerland has created a multifaceted framework of relations, based 
on selective formal agreements – including Schengen but excluding financial services – 
and much informal integration. The result is far from a finished product and remains the 
subject of internal debate.  
2.1 Bilateral agreements 
Swiss relations with the EU go back to agreements signed in the 1950s. Although 
developed after the 1972 Free Trade Agreement with a flurry of technical agreements, 
they proved unsatisfactory, given the pace of Community integration. Hence 
Switzerland entered the negotiations which led to the 1991 signing of the European 
Economic Area [EEA] agreement. But EEA membership was narrowly defeated at a 
referendum in December 1992.  
                                                 
1 Trading Places: Is EU membership still the best option for UK trade   Open Europe (2012) 




The government was then forced to fall back on bilateral sectoral agreements. The first 
batch, covering free movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, public 
procurement, agriculture, research, civil aviation and overland transport, took nearly 
ten years to come into effect. A second package was agreed in 2004, covering 
processed agricultural goods, Europol, environment, fraud controls, MEDIA, pensions, 
statistics, taxation of savings and, especially, Schengen and Dublin.  
As time went on these Bilaterals became a value in their own right in the public mind, 
and not a stopgap. Since then a few other deals have been signed covering Eurojust 
(2008), education (2010), Fund regulations (2011) and the European Defence Agency 
(2012), together with a 2011 increase in the withholding tax rates. The Bilaterals have 
also been extended to new EU member states that have, additionally, benefited from 
Swiss stabilisation and cohesion payments. All told there are now at least 120 technical 
accords, managed by 27 joint committees.  
2.2 Europeanisation 
The limitations of these formal agreements encouraged Switzerland to embark on a 
continuing process of informal Europeanisation to keep the country close to the EU 
where necessary. This involves the autonomous adoption of EU norms, transport 
arrangements and some domestic policy adjustments.  
Thus, since 1988 Switzerland has checked all draft Bills relating to economic activity for 
their compatibility with EU laws. In fact around 40% of Swiss legislation derives from EU 
rules - ironically more than twice as much as in the British context - and has, for 
example, led to the adoption of similar provisions on air traffic, commercial law and 
intellectual property measures.  
Switzerland has also decided to adjust domestic policies to fit with European 
requirements in areas as diverse as the financing of Alpine base rail tunnels and wage 
and welfare provisions to cope with free movement of labour.  
2.3 Continuation and controversy 
This process of adaptation to the EU is unfinished. Despite the virtual standstill in recent 
years the Swiss want to develop their bilateral relations into food and product safety, 
cooperation between competition authorities, GALILEO, electricity and REACH. In June 
2012 the government presented proposals for meeting the Union’s desire for institutional 
provisions involving automatic acceptance of changes in relevant EU legislation, 
jurisdiction equivalent to that of the ECJ and more uniform implementation.  
However, the Council decision of 21 December 2012 made it clear that, while the EU is 
willing to carry on talking because the Swiss had moved in its direction, it could not 
accept their actual proposals. For the EU, the bilateral road has come to an end. It also 
reiterated its unease about Swiss cantonal tax arrangements and interference with free 
movement of persons. Nonetheless, the statement was welcomed by Berne which still 
believes bilateral deals possible.  
Unsurprisingly relations with the EU remain a matter of continuing domestic debate, with 
some talking of joining the EEA or negotiating an Association agreement and others of 




3 The place of financial services within Swiss-EU relations 
Although the Swiss financial sector is proportionally larger than its British counterpart, it 
has not featured prominently in formal Swiss-EU relations. Two phases must be 
distinguished in its evolution: until 2006, when it became clear that the Swiss would not 
be joining the Union, there was something of a policy vacuum in Brussels on Switzerland. 
Thereafter things have become increasingly difficult for the Swiss finance industry. 
3.1 Formal agreements 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no bilateral service agreement, although the second 
package of bilateral agreements assumed that there would be one. But negotiations 
failed in 2003 mainly because of Swiss reservations, including banks’ insistence on 
secrecy.  
There are only three formal service accords: a little used 1989 non-life insurance 
agreement; annexes to the free movement of persons agreement; and the 2004 
withholding tax agreement which has led to the signing of so called ‘Rubiks’ 
withholding tax treaties with the UK, Germany and Austria (and also planned with 
France, Greece and Italy). This leaves Switzerland much in the same situation as states 
dependent on the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] when accessing the 
EU market.  
3.2 Structures and strategies  
Although Swiss firms have sometimes found that freedom of movement for capital is 
narrowly interpreted in the Union where third countries are concerned, large Swiss firms 
have come to terms with this, operating through subsidiaries in London and elsewhere. 
Though extremely cumbersome this does give them full access to the EU market. But 
unlike for EU-based financial industry, cross-border service delivery is merely tolerated 
where it is observed, not established by right, and room for interpretation remains. 
The Swiss have also been able to treat the three jurisdictions to which they are 
subjected as a single ‘College’ of Regulators, involving FINMA (the Swiss Financial 
Markets authority), the FSA (now the PRA and FCA) and the SEC. Banks have also 
encouraged the Swiss government to enact policies which have generally proved 
beneficial for financial services, notably the preservation of cantonal insurance and 
other monopolies, and the negotiation of the ‘Rubiks’ treaties. However, Zurich insurers 
are now complaining that premature and heavy handed Swiss application of EU rules is 
threatening their competitiveness while private bankers are calling for new deals with 
France and other countries to avoid a loss of clients.  
3.3 Impact 
So far, the Swiss financial sector has performed well, in part thanks to EU goodwill. This 
has meant no completed WTO cases, and acceptance of Swiss firms providing services 
through London and sometimes, residually, directly into the EU despite the lack of a 
legal right to do so. Nevertheless, lack of legal remedies and de facto asymmetry in 
front of the ECJ can occasionally cause problems. 
Large enterprises are relatively happy with the status quo, but some wealth managers 
and small firms have found operating in EU markets increasingly difficult. Switzerland 
thus lacks the full market access enjoyed by EEA-based financial bodies.  
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3.4 A changing scene  
The prevailing situation now seems under threat, as the Swiss financial sector faces 
tougher EU rules on third country operations. These can be discriminatory. MiFID II is seen 
as creating new barriers for Swiss firms by forcing more of them to open (larger) 
subsidiaries in the EEA and to obtain authorisation from an EEA Member State in order to 
gain an ‘EU passport’.  
Hence, once the new EU legislation is fully in force and the four new supervisory 
agencies operational (the European Banking Agency, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and 
the European Systemic Risk Board), the problem for Swiss-based financial institutions will 
be two fold. First, to access the EU market, an equivalence certificate is needed. To 
obtain this, the Swiss authorities must demonstrate that not only are they able to 
supervise their own, but that they can also control EU-based businesses. Second, there 
are at least 20 different equivalence requirements in place, due to the (sub) sector-
specific approach of EU regulation. Both factors make obtaining equivalence a 
burdensome process. 
Hence, the financial industry in particular will be faced with a choice of fully adapting 
to EU standards, once they are in place, or simply being shut out of the EU market. The 
‘letterbox’ provision in AIFMD, according to which hedge funds have to locate 
significant management functions in the EU, might have similarly far-reaching 
consequences. If Swiss firms can no longer provide cross-border services into the EU, this 
could be very damaging in terms of job losses, decreasing tax revenue and prestige. 
For example, unofficial estimates from the Swiss banking sector speak of up to 29,000 
jobs that could be lost in this way.  
3.5 The tax and bank secrecy dimensions 
The sector is also much involved in the tax negotiations which have run in parallel with 
recent developments. Because the EU sees Switzerland as a major player in this area, it 
is concerned about cantonal tax rates, concessions to foreign businesses and the 
‘Rubiks’ deals. The EU wants Switzerland to adopt its 1997 Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation, leading the government to consult on a negotiating mandate.  
Switzerland is also under pressure from other quarters: the US, the OECD, the IMF and the 
Financial Stability Board. This has encouraged the Swiss government to draft a White 
Money strategy as an alternative to the automatic exchange of bank client 
information; but Luxembourg’s negotiation on FATCA might again reinforce the EU’s 
insistence on automatic information exchange. 
4 The Swiss approach assessed 
Contrary to prevailing perceptions, the Swiss approach is not a way of staying aloof 
from the EU. Rather, over the years the Swiss have sought to ensure that they are not 
compromising access to the EU market. It has been said that the country needed to be 






4.1 The nature of Swiss relationships  
The Swiss approach is still under construction rather than being a finished product. It is a 
complicated series of pragmatic responses introduced, over time, to secure the 
country’s interests. From the EU point of view, it is less a bilateral framework than a series 
of sectoral means of engaging Switzerland in the multilateral market system. 
Moreover, the approach is much more than a free trade agreement even if it lacks a 
services component. Switzerland has had to adopt a version of the Cassis de Dijon 
principle as well as going down the bilateral road to make good both the insufficiencies 
of the FTA and the gaps arising from self-exclusion from the EEA. So the approach is a 
strategy for drawing nearer to the EU and not the reverse, as the trajectory of the last 20 
years shows.  
4.2 Opinion in the EU and in Switzerland  
Far from having been imposed on the Union, the present framework owes a good deal 
to EU tolerance. It also requires a great deal of Swiss adjustment to EU legislation. 
Indeed many of the country’s borrowings are a matter of cutting and pasting, even in 
areas where it was not specifically required, notably in competition law.  
It is certainly true that the bilateral approach enjoys domestic legitimacy overall in 
Switzerland, as evidenced by referendums and opinion polls. However, bilateralism is 
queried not only in Brussels but also domestically. Europhiles point to its weaknesses 
while the radical right Swiss People’s Party (SVP) attacks it as a ‘creeping membership’ 
approach which is taking Europeanisation too far.  
4.3 Advantages 
Nonetheless the approach seems to preserve sovereignty, allowing Switzerland freedom 
both to decide what relations it will have with the EU and carry out its own trade and 
currency relations with the rest of the world. Equally it enjoys full freedom of movement 
of goods and people while being spared the costs and constraints of the CAP and 
other policies. So it has not had to reform its post, railways and telecommunications. 
Switzerland can also rapidly adjust EU rules in areas where it has decided to shadow the 
EU. So far it has maintained a low VAT rate while avoiding automatic exchange of 
financial information. Swiss-based financial services, finally, have so far been offered in 
the EU through subsidiaries, but with the major share of added value generated and 
supervision exercised at home. 
4.4 Disadvantages 
Conversely, while there is nominal autonomy, the system provides Switzerland with 
virtually no political influence. Moreover, as the bilateral accords are based on EU law 
as it was at the time of negotiation, they cannot be easily adjusted to changes in EU 
policy, made without Swiss input. Indeed the Swiss do not always know what new rules 
are coming, which can be costly for the country’s businesses. The government often has 
to use bilateral talks with member states in order to learn about EU policy intentions. 






Financially, the Swiss are required to make cohesion and research payments which 
have not always been popular domestically. Close relations with the EU also expose 
internal Swiss fiscal arrangements to constant sniping. Being economically close and 
politically distant also leads to continuing domestic tensions. Finally, given EU resistance 
to going further down the unreformed bilateral road, it is questionable whether the 
approach is sustainable. Indeed, some Swiss observers believe that bilateral deals were 
only agreed because the Union was hoping to encourage Swiss membership.  
4.5 Outlook 
Faced with EU regulation that specifically targets the financial market and largely 
excludes third-country based industries, the Swiss will have to choose between four 
options. The first, withdrawing from all deals and accepting that Switzerland would have 
no privileged access to the EU market, is a ‘nuclear option’ unlikely to appeal to 
business interests. The second, joining the EEA, is technically possible and might not 
change the status quo all that much but because it would both go back on the 1992 
decision and represent a visible loss of sovereignty it is politically unacceptable to most 
Swiss. Even though some politicians are now canvassing the idea, having to copy and 
paste most EU legislation would clash with Swiss democratic ideals.  
The third option, seeking full membership of the EU, is even more politically explosive, 
and the government has clearly and consistently ruled it out for several years despite 
claims that it is surreptiously preparing a referendum on entry. It has ruled entry out 
because of public hostility, despite the fact that it could give the country the influence 
it presently so obviously lacks. The only option left is the fourth one: continuing the status 
quo and autonomously adopting only as much regulation as necessary while 
accepting that the country will have to manage without any influence over the rules 
which significantly affect domestic policy. However, even here insecurity as to whether, 
when and in what form EU agencies and/or Member States will accept equivalence 
remains, and pros and cons of the four options will have to be reconsidered.   
5 The challenges of Switzerland’s approach to EU engagement 
Switzerland’s relationship with the EU has required it to balance closeness to the EU 
through continuous adaptation, while accepting a diminution of influence over 
adopted policy and regulation. It has required extensive and lengthy negotiations with 
Brussels on bilateral sector agreements, and new relations with other international 
partners together with structural changes at home.  
5.1 The need for closeness  
The most significant challenge faced by the Swiss is that economic integration with the 
EU without membership requires close and ongoing co-ordination with EU norms, 
notably through autonomous adaptation, most recently through the recent Swiss 
popular vote to create barriers to abusive executive pay which is in line with its own 
moves to cap bonuses. However, with EU policies which are not resonant with Swiss 







5.2 The need for continual adaptation 
The second lesson is that any initial deal can only be a beginning, since the EU is a 
moving target. The Swiss government has had to remain adaptive and alert, ensuring 
that industry, particularly its financial sector, stays in close touch with changes in EU 
policy, despite not being able to influence policymaking.  
This also poses challenges where Switzerland wishes to exert autonomy over policy; 
voices are now being raised in Brussels about the Swiss use of the emergency brakes 
clauses in its free movement agreements. Such concerns are likely to be increased by 
Swiss talk of rejecting at a referendum the extension of free movement to Croatia, 
something which could have disruptive consequences.  
 
5.3 Going beyond free trade  
A third lesson is that a free trade treaty would have been insufficient, making 
supplementary bilateral agreements necessary to access the Single Market. In the 
current context, for any country adopting such an approach, agreement on the 
degree to which national firms would be subject to EU regulation and ECJ jurisdiction 
would be essential. Any such agreement would also have to cover a sufficiently wide 
range of sectors, including financial services and would need favourable rules both on 
doing business via subsidiaries and branches and on cross-border business. Furthermore, 
appeal to the ECJ would only be possible in areas specified in a formal agreement.  
5.4 Explaining and negotiating  
Fourthly, the complexity of Switzerland’s EU engagement may cause confusion to 
outsiders, particularly potential trading partners. Switzerland faces an opportunity cost 
of non-membership in terms of lack of influence over negotiation, in addition to the 
financial contribution required to maintain access to the Single Market. It also faces 
uncertainty over the potential for agreeing future sectoral agreements.  
Outside tax questions, finance has not played a large part in Swiss-EU relations, partly 
because the country has been so integrated and partly because finance does not 
have its own bilateral accord. However, three more challenges emerge in terms of Swiss 
financial firms’ access to the EU financial market.  Switzerland does not have a bilateral 
service agreement with the EU on financial services, and while the Swiss financial 
services sector has so far performed well as a result of the establishment of wholly 
owned subsidiaries in London and other EU financial centres, under increasingly 
stringent third country rules it may have to consider separate deals with neighbouring 
states. As European-wide financial supervision and regulation are developed, the Swiss 
government is likely to be required to emulate the EU’s approach to maintain market 
access.  
The future form of engagement between Switzerland and the EU is difficult to predict as 
it will be contingent on attitudes both within Switzerland and the EU, transitory 
agreements and individual firms’ reactions. In the last few years, the EU has rejected 
ideas of a new sectoral deal with Switzerland, demanding instead an agreement which 
includes automatic acceptance of the changing acquis, ECJ-like jurisdiction and 






5.5 Internal implications 
Finally, continual adaptation of internal structures and policies is required to maintain 
Switzerland’s current relationship with the EU. Equally, only because the Swiss 
government and its finance sector work together, has it been possible to resist external 
pressure: so extensive consultation and mutual support are key. Continuing internal 
contestation is also to be expected.  
6 Concluding comments 
Swiss relations with the EU are complicated, multifaceted and increasingly uncertain. 
They are an exception, created out of past Swiss need, policy and politics, developed 
over time and through a process of negotiation.  
Swiss financial services firms face a significant amount of legal insecurity and multiple 
but ‘equivalent’ regulatory regimes. They depend on subsidiaries located in London 
and other European financial services centres to conduct cross-border business with EU 
member states, unless a formal bilateral agreement including financial services is 
negotiated (as a stand-alone arrangement or as part of a package deal). 
As an approach, Swiss relationships with the EU are not a formal ‘model’, and the Swiss 
approach does not lend itself to being readily replicated. Moreover, Switzerland has 
embarked on a continuing process of informal Europeanisation to keep the country 
close to the EU where necessary – the approach therefore involves remaining closely 
connected to the EU rather than keeping a distance. 
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